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Introduction
Common rules on most aspects of the asylum process are in force in the 
European Union (EU), building on the international refugee protec-
tion regime. This so-called EU asylum acquis has resulted in a “Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS)”. EU legislation states that the CEAS 
is to be based on a full and inclusive application of the 1951 UN Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). The 
principle of non-refoulement—also included in the Refugee Convention—
is the most important principle in asylum law and is laid down in several 
international legal instruments.1 This principle prohibits the forced direct or 
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indirect removal of a person to a country or territory where he2 runs a risk 
of being subjected to severe human rights violations.
The CEAS consists of rules to determine which State is responsible for 
determining a claim; to define asylum seekers’ entitlements and obligations 
as regards their reception in Member States; to regulate the asylum proce-
dure itself; and to determine who qualifies for international protection.
Unlike the rest of the chapters in this volume, this chapter is not empiri-
cal, but sets out the legal framework for asylum determination in Europe. Its 
primary purpose is to offer a reflection on and some insight into the func-
tioning of the CEAS, with a view to creating a legal background and frame-
work for the ethnographic chapters that follow.
International and European Law Framework
The CEAS is a fundamental part of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), and its aim is to establish a fair and efficient asylum system. 
The CEAS consists of a legal framework covering all aspects of the asy-
lum process, and a support agency—the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO). One must bear in mind that achieving the CEAS’ twofold goal of 
efficiency and fairness is, from a human rights perspective, a task that cre-
ates internal contradictions, in the sense that implementing efficiency may 
rule out fairness, and promoting fairness requires an investment of time 
and effort which State authorities may discourage. The task of reconciling, 
in individual cases, the conflicts inherent in pursuing this twofold goal falls 
on decision-makers and judges (see, for example, the chapters by Kobelinsky, 
Hambly, Affolter et al., and Liodden, this volume). As demonstrated 
throughout this book, not only decision-makers, but a cast of other actors 
also have profound influences. The substantive chapters of this book provide 
perspectives on the conflicts inherent in asylum decision-making and on how 
the actors involved attempt to resolve them, but while most of the coun-
tries discussed here participate fully in the CEAS, not all do. Two Member 
States (UK and Denmark) exercise opt-outs in relation to certain CEAS 
measures, and another two are non-EU countries (Norway and Switzerland). 
However, all of the countries take part in the ‘Dublin regime’, and have other 
2Early refugee law has been ‘characterized by a complete blindness to women, gender, and issues of 
sexual inequality’ (Edwards 2010: 23). We are aware that nowadays reference would be made to ‘they’ 
instead of ‘he’, but as this is a legal chapter for reasons of clarity we are using ‘he’ if the actual legal text 
uses ‘he’.
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 associations with the AFSJ. We therefore focus in this  chapter on the CEAS, 
and on its contradictory aims and themes, because they flesh out the mean-
ing, as well as the weakness, of international protection standards, and they 
also highlight the conflicts—between fairness and efficiency, and between 
protection and exclusion—which bedevil asylum decision-making processes 
in all of the countries covered here.
Since 1999, the CEAS has gone through two phases of legislation. The 
first culminated in 2005, and the second concluded in 2013. The first 
phase focused on harmonisation on the basis of common minimum stand-
ards, leading to the second, whose aim was the establishment of a single 
asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum 
throughout the EU, an aim which has not yet been achieved. Whereas 
some common EU rules in the asylum field take the form of directly bind-
ing ‘Regulations’, most take the form of ‘Directives’, which require Member 
States to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of achieving 
that result. Directives are usually transposed into national legislation. They 
therefore depend on national implementation for their effectiveness.
The protection of asylum seekers, refugees and those in need of subsidiary 
protection can be characterised as an interplay between several overlapping 
legal regimes. The main instruments are the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, 
the UN Convention against Torture, the UN Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, EU law and the ECHR.3
Judicial scrutiny at the highest level is performed by the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU), which has jurisdiction to consider requests for prelimi-
nary rulings from national courts, as well as dealing with appeals and other 
matters. The CJEU is tasked with examining the legality of EU measures, 
interpreting EU law, and ensuring its uniform application across the 28 EU 
Member States. In the implementation of this last task, the CJEU relies on 
national courts to apply EU law uniformly in their respective jurisdictions, 
albeit under the supervision of the CJEU. The CJEU is first and foremost an 
important actor in the protection of human rights, drawing on them as fun-
damental principles of EU law, and ruling on how human rights standards 
should be interpreted across the Member States. This Court is not to be con-
fused with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a permanent 
international court set up in 1959 with jurisdiction to rule on all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the ECHR; it specialises in 
3Currently, all Member States have ratified the ECHR as well as several non-EU countries and even 
some non-European countries.
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the safeguarding of a minimum level of human rights protection among the 
ECHR’s contracting parties. The ECtHR may receive applications from any 
person, group or non-governmental organisation claiming to be the victim 
of a violation of the rights set out in the ECHR by one of its state parties.
The terms used in European asylum law need some clarification. In daily 
life the terms ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’ are often used inter-
changeably, but they refer to different legal statuses. ‘Migrant’ is the gen-
eral term for people who move from one region to another. This movement 
might be voluntary or because of economic hardship or other problems.4 
The term ‘asylum seeker’ is used for someone who has left their country to 
seek international protection. In EU law, international protection takes two 
forms. In the first place, protection as a refugee: ‘refugee’ refers to a person 
who has fled their country and cannot return because of a well-founded 
fear of persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.5 In the second place, someone 
who has fled because they face serious harm6 may qualify for international 
protection. Serious harm may consist of: (a) the death penalty or execu-
tion; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an 
applicant in their country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a 
civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict.
Situations of armed conflict and violence frequently involve exposure to 
serious human rights violations or other serious harm amounting to perse-
cution or serious harm. Such persecution/serious harm could include situa-
tions of genocide and ethnic cleansing; torture and other forms of inhuman 
or degrading treatment; rape and other forms of sexual violence; forced 
recruitment, including of children; arbitrary arrest and detention; hostage 
taking and enforced or arbitrary disappearances. In situations of armed con-
flict and violence a person may be at risk of being singled out or targeted 
for persecution or serious harm. Equally, in such situations, entire groups or 
populations may be at risk of persecution, leaving each member of the group 
at risk. The fact that many or all members of particular communities are at 
risk does not undermine the validity of any particular individual’s claim.7
6Article 15 QDII. The UK and Ireland opted into the CEAS’ first phase instruments, which means that 
they are still bound by the original QD1 and APD1. Article 15 QDI is in similar terms.
7See UNHCR (2016, paras. 13 and 16).
4See EASO Practical Guide Evidence assessment: https://www.easo.europa.eu/practical-tools.
5Article 1A(2) UN Refugee Convention.
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At the time of writing, the main CEAS legislation comprises the revised 
Dublin Regulation (Dublin III), the revised Eurodac Regulation, the 
Reception Conditions Directive (I or II), the Qualification Directive (I 
or II) and the Asylum Procedures Directive (I or II). Most of the coun-
tries whose national asylum systems provide the focus for the substantive 
chapters of this book participate in both phases of CEAS legislation but, 
as noted above, four do not. The UK chose to ‘opt in’ to the first phase of 
CEAS legislation, but then took a piecemeal approach, ‘opting out’ of the 
revised ‘second phase’ versions of the Reception Conditions Directive (II), 
Qualification Directive (II), and Asylum Procedures Directive (II), and 
‘opting in’ to the revised Dublin Regulation (Dublin III) and the revised 
Eurodac Regulation (aka the Dublin system). Denmark has a long-standing 
‘opt-out’ arrangement in relation to most CEAS measures but like the UK, 
it participates in the Dublin system. As already noted, Switzerland and 
Norway are non-EU states that participate in the Dublin system, and their 
position is, of course, of interest to the UK in the context of the June 2016 
Brexit vote. Whether, as part of the Brexit negotiations, the UK would also 
seek to continue its participation in the Dublin system following its depar-
ture from the EU is something we can speculate about, especially given the 
UK’s common interest with the rest of the EU in the security objectives of 
the Eurodac database, but nothing can be assumed.
The Dublin III Regulation establishes a hierarchy of criteria for identify-
ing which EU Member State is responsible for examining an asylum seeker’s 
claim for protection in Europe. To establish this responsibility the applicant 
is fingerprinted, and the information goes to the Eurodac database (Eurodac 
Regulation). The aim of the Dublin Regulation is to ensure that only one 
EU Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum applica-
tion (to deter multiple asylum claims), and to allow that State to be identi-
fied as quickly as possible. The Dublin regime permits Member States to rely 
on the principle of mutual trust and the presumption that all EU Member 
States are safe for all asylum seekers: its criteria therefore provide that most 
asylum seekers may be sent back to their state of entry. This leads to an une-
qual distribution of asylum seekers amongst EU Member States and to the 
Member States where most asylum seekers enter the EU, such as Greece and 
Italy, facing problems in managing the increasing numbers of asylum seekers 
arriving (Guild 2016; Costello and Mouzarakis 2014). The extreme suffering 
which the operation of the Dublin criteria has caused to individuals has led 
to landmark cases being decided by the ECtHR and the CJEU which rec-
ognised the failure of the mutual trust principle and of the presumption of 
safety in the Dublin regime. This case law has been codified in the Dublin 
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III Regulation so that it is not possible to transfer an asylum seeker to the 
responsible Member State where ‘there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception 
conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhu-
man or degrading treatment’. In these circumstances, the Member State that 
is prevented from transferring the asylum seeker must examine the applica-
tion itself.8
The Reception Conditions Directive9 sets out common standards for 
reception conditions for asylum seekers and makes it clear that an asylum 
seeker is entitled to reception while their asylum claim is being determined. 
It sets out rules relating to housing, food, health care and employment, as 
well as detailed common rules governing the limited circumstances in which 
asylum seekers can be detained.
The Qualification Directive10 sets out the standards to establish whether 
third country nationals or stateless persons11 should be granted international 
protection. It defines who may be a beneficiary of international protection 
and describes the content of that protection. International protection may 
be given in the form of two different statuses, namely refugee status or sub-
sidiary protection status.12 Subsidiary protection aims to cover other forms 
of protection, as guaranteed by human rights treaties, such as the ECHR 
or the UN Convention against Torture. The Qualification Directive aims to 
harmonise eligibility criteria for international protection, and incorporates 
a series of rights for beneficiaries of international protection (protection 
against refoulement, residence permits, travel documents, access to employ-
ment, access to education, social welfare, healthcare, access to accommoda-
tion, access to integration facilities, as well as specific provisions for children 
and vulnerable persons). By defining and harmonising the guarantees in 
human rights treaties which all the countries discussed in this volume have 
signed up to, the Qualification Directive (QD) provides the tools for giving 
meaning to those guarantees.
8Article 3(2) Dublin III. This Article codifies the cases ECtHR 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09, M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece and CJEU 21 December 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and 
Others.
9RCDII. Denmark, and the UK are not bound by this Directive, but Ireland has opted into the RCDII 
(Recast Reception Conditions Directive). The UK is bound by the terms of RCDI.
10QDII. The UK and Ireland opted into the CEAS’ first phase instruments, which means that they are 
still bound by the original QDI.
11A third country national is a national of a non-EU country.
12Article 2 QDII; Article 2 QD1.
2 Legal Overview     33
The standards to guarantee access to a fair and efficient asylum system 
are laid out in the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD).13 The asylum pro-
cedure is meant to establish whether a third country national should be 
granted international protection, and whether the asylum seeker is entitled 
to have his claim processed according to the procedural standards of the 
APD. The APD aims to ensure fair, quick and good quality asylum deci-
sions, and also that asylum seekers with special needs (such as unaccom-
panied minors) receive the necessary support to make their claims. Other 
procedural rights include rights to a personal interview, to legal assistance, 
a right to appeal and the right to remain in the territory while an appeal is 
being determined.14
The Asylum Procedure: Determining Refugee—
Or Subsidiary Protection Status
In EU asylum procedures the central question that must be answered is 
whether an asylum seeker is in need of international protection. EU law 
stipulates that a person qualifies for international protection if he or she is 
a refugee and thus fears persecution, or if they would be subjected to serious 
harm when returned to their country of origin.15 Protection entails—more 
than anything else—the prohibition of ‘refoulement ’. This prohibition is 
firmly rooted in international,16 European17 and EU18 law, and means that a 
state is prohibited from sending a person (back) to a place where they could 
be persecuted or risk serious harm.19 An applicant qualifies for international 
protection if they have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion in accordance with the 1951 Convention, or would face a real 
risk of suffering serious harm if returned to the country of origin or habitual 
residence. To determine an asylum application, evidence may be submitted 
13APDII. The UK and Ireland opted into the CEAS’ first phase instruments, which means that they are 
still bound by the original APD1.
14Articles 14, 22, 24, 46 QDII; Articles 12, 39 QD1.
15Article 4(3) QDII; Article 4(3) QD1.
16Article 33 Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture, Article 7 UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
17Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights.
18Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
19Article 15 QDII; Article 15 QDI.
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by an applicant to substantiate his or her application and may also be gath-
ered by the determining authority through its own means. Evidence may 
include anything that asserts, confirms, supports, refutes or otherwise bears 
on the relevant facts in issue.
Article 8(2) APDI (Article 10(3) APDII) requires Member States to 
ensure that ‘decisions by the determining authority on applications for asy-
lum are taken after an appropriate examination’. To this end, Member States 
should ensure that applications are examined and decisions taken individ-
ually, objectively, and impartially. Article 9(2) APDI (Article 11(2) APDII) 
requires that, where an application is rejected, the reasons in fact and in law 
are stated in the decision. The obligation to state reasons for a decision that 
are sufficiently specific and concrete to allow the applicant to understand 
why his or her application has been rejected has been framed as a corollary 
of the fundamental EU law principle of the right to defence.
Actors
In the asylum procedure, where refugee status determination (RSD) and 
subsidiary protection status determination take place many ‘actors’ are 
involved. In this volume we see as main actors asylum seekers themselves 
(including unaccompanied minor asylum seekers; (Chapter 6), immigration 
officers and decision makers (Chapters 12–14), Home Office Presenting 
Officers (HOPOs; Chapter 5) judges (Chapter 3), interpreters (Chapter 7) 
and lawyers (Chapter 10). In principle, there is an even wider cast of ‘actors’ 
than this, including clerks, security staff, witnesses, MacKenzie friends, 
observers of the case such as media and researchers.
Legal texts on refugee law define actors differently. From the legal per-
spective, we think of ‘actors of persecution or serious harm’ and ‘actors of 
protection’. Actors of persecution or serious harm include: (a) the State; (b) 
parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the ter-
ritory of the State; and (c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that 
the state and international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide 
protection against persecution or serious harm.20 Actors of protection, pro-
tect against persecution or serious harm. These can be: (a) the State; or (b) 
parties or organisations, including international organisations, controlling 
20Article 6 QDII; Article 6 QD1.
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the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State; provided they are 
willing and able to offer protection.21
With regard to the actors in the chapters of this volume, some defi-
nitions, as well as guidance about their role and treatment are also to be 
found in the CEAS. Article 2(l) QDII defines an ‘unaccompanied minor’ as 
a minor who arrives on the territory of the Member State unaccompanied 
by an adult responsible for them whether by law or by the practice of the 
Member State concerned, and for as long as they are not effectively taken 
into the care of such a person; that includes a minor who is left unaccom-
panied after they have entered the territory of the Member State. Also in the 
APD special rules apply to asylum seeking children, and it should be borne 
in mind that according to preamble (33) to the APD, the best interests of 
the child should be a primary consideration of Member States when apply-
ing the APD, in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. In assessing the best interest of the child, Member States should 
in particular take due account of the minor’s well-being and social develop-
ment, including their background.
With regard to immigration officers and decision makers, para. (16) of 
the preamble to the APD states that:
It is essential that decisions on all applications for international protection be 
taken on the basis of the facts and, in the first instance, by authorities whose 
personnel has the appropriate knowledge or has received the necessary training 
in the field of international protection.
And in relation to HOPOs (Chapter 5), who represent the UK’s Home 
Office at appeal hearings, para. (17) of the APD’s preamble states ‘In order 
to ensure that applications for international protection are examined and 
decisions thereon are taken objectively and impartially, it is necessary that 
professionals acting in the framework of the procedures provided for in this 
Directive perform their activities with due respect for the applicable deonto-
logical principles’.
The central role of judges is recognised in Article 46 APDII concerning 
the right to an effective remedy for challenging a negative decision.22 Even 
in areas where common standards apply, there is need for judicial scrutiny 
22Article 39 APDI.
21Article 7 QDII; Article 7 QDI.
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of first instance decisions. In 2015 Hungary recognised only 10% of its asy-
lum seekers as needing protection. The figure in Germany was 40% and 
it reached 65% in Italy. The differences regarding refugees from Iraq were 
particularly extreme. On the EU average, one in two was considered wor-
thy of protection, in Italy almost all and in Greece only 3%—in spite of 
the fact that all follow the same European law. European courts have high-
lighted, and even heightened, the contrasting situations in different Member 
States. For instance, ever since the ECtHR in 2011 cited grave shortcom-
ings in the Greek asylum process, and declared the living conditions of refu-
gees there to be ‘inhumane’ (see also Giannopoulou and Gill, this volume), 
Germany has not sent any asylum seekers back to Greece.23 Nor is Italy nec-
essarily a secure third country. At the end of 2014, the human rights court 
decreed that the Swiss-ordered deportation of an eight-member family from 
Afghanistan was ‘inhumane treatment’—because no assurance could be 
received from Italy that the children would be housed in a manner suitable 
to their age and that the family could remain together.24
Communication
The UNHCR Handbook is the authoritative source of guidance for govern-
ment decision makers, and it acknowledges that some asylum seekers might 
be reticent with officials due to their experiences in their home country. 
Many are tired, anxious or feel inhibited during the interview.25
Communication in asylum interviews is different from everyday con-
versation due to at least three factors (Doornbos 2005). First, the interloc-
utors often do not speak the same language (van der Kleij 2015: 253). In 
the vast majority of cases, the officer conducts the interview with the assis-
tance of an interpreter, employed by the Ministry of Justice, Border Agency, 
etc., on a sessional basis. Secondly, communication in asylum cases is a form 
of intercultural communication (Kälin 1986: 23). Thirdly, communica-
tion in asylum cases is a form of institutional interaction: communication 
within a strictly organised, often bureaucratic context (Drew and Heritage 
1992). The CEAS framework acknowledges that the asylum process needs 
23Judgment of the ECtHR 21 January 2011, Application no. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. 
and CJEU 21 December 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others.
24ECtHR 4 November 2014, Application no. 29217/12, Tarakhel. See also: http://www.zeit.de/
gesellschaft/2016-03/european-asylum-law-refugees-turkey/seite-2.
25Para. 198 and 199 UNHCR Handbook.
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to provide a context within which communication is possible, but it takes 
a pragmatic approach. Preamble (25) APDII provides that ‘every applicant 
should have […] the opportunity to cooperate and effectively communicate 
with the competent authorities so as to present the relevant facts of his or 
her case’. Expanding on this, Article 12 APDII specifies that providing the 
services of an interpreter is a basic guarantee for asylum applicants when 
submitting their case to the competent authorities, and Article 14 requires 
the competent authorities to:
select an interpreter who is able to ensure appropriate communication between 
the applicant and the person who conducts the interview, in a language pre-
ferred by the applicant, unless there is another language which he or she 
understands and in which he or she is able to communicate clearly.26
Throughout this volume, and particularly in Part II, perspectives on com-
munication build on the linguistic, cross-cultural and bureaucratic issues 
referred to above, and consider in detail the influence which the actors 
involved have on the process. They examine the provision of interpretation, 
the interviewing and decision-making processes, etc., and they reflect on the 
roles of the interpreter, applicant, decision maker, lawyer and other actors 
who influence the process in formal and informal ways. The interpreter’s 
active role in communicating between applicant and decision-maker, and 
the implications of their ability, through their omissions and interventions, 
to influence the fairness (or otherwise) of the outcome of the claim come 
in for particular attention. These chapters capture the challenges posed to 
the asylum process by cross-cultural communication, and they also bring out 
the essentially narrative and communicative nature of the asylum process 
(Zahle 2005). The pragmatic approach to communication which the proce-
dural rules of the APD take—requiring provision of an interpreter capable 
of ensuring ‘appropriate communication’—struggles to embrace the com-
plex communication needs that accompany the recounting of traumatic per-
sonal experiences, and as these chapters show, the rules rely heavily on the 
behaviour of individual interpreters and decision-makers.
26Reasonable requests that the interpreter be of the same gender as the applicant should also be com-
plied with, and interviews with minors should be conducted in a child appropriate manner (Article 14 
APDII).
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Decision Making
Being recognised as a refugee or receiving subsidiary protection is vitally 
dependent on the legal or administrative process by which governments 
determine protection claims. In relation to the decision-making process, the 
UNHCR handbook states:
It should be recalled that an applicant for refugee status is normally in a par-
ticularly vulnerable situation. He finds himself in an alien environment and 
may experience serious difficulties, technical and psychological, in submit-
ting his case to the authorities of a foreign country, often in a language not 
his own. His application should therefore be examined within the framework 
of specially established procedures by qualified personnel having the necessary 
knowledge and experience, and an understanding of an applicant’s particular 
difficulties and needs. (UNHCR 2011, para. 190)
The ECtHR has held that individuals need access to the asylum procedure as 
well as adequate information concerning the procedure to be followed. The 
authorities are also required to avoid excessively long delays in deciding asy-
lum claims. In assessing the effectiveness of examining first instance asylum 
claims, the ECtHR has also considered other factors, such as the availability 
of interpreters, access to legal aid and the existence of a reliable system of 
communication with asylum seekers.27
Standard and Burden of Proof
The effectiveness of the right to asylum and to be protected against refoule-
ment would be undermined if States placed too heavy a burden on appli-
cants of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm. As 
regards the standard of proof, the asylum seeker is expected to show that 
there is a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ of future persecution or that 
there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of seri-
ous harm. This standard is relatively relaxed: it is far lower than the crim-
inal law standard, and even the usual civil law standard, and this suggests 
that proving an asylum claim should be comparatively straightforward. 
27ECtHR 21 January 2011, Application no. 30696/09, M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece, para. 293.
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Understanding why it is not straightforward requires us to consider in some 
detail what is involved in substantiating an asylum claim.
States are afforded extensive discretion when laying down the rules for 
asylum procedures regarding the burden and standard of proof. As regards 
the burden of proof, this is placed on the asylum seeker. Usually states expect 
asylum seekers to adduce evidence in order to substantiate their asylum 
claim. For many asylum seekers, it is difficult to obtain such evidence.
States will take into account different forms of evidence—including 
documents and other evidence—concerning the position and personal cir-
cumstances of the applicant: their nationality; the reasons for applying for 
asylum, including previous persecution; the situation in the country of ori-
gin; the applicant’s activities in the country of refuge; and the availability of 
safe third countries. Medical reports, country of origin information (COI) 
and language analysis are also relevant in this framework.
Evidentiary Assessment
Evidentiary assessment can be defined as the primary method of establishing 
the facts of an individual case through the process of examining and com-
paring available pieces of evidence. The assessment of evidence is, in gen-
eral, not regulated by international law (UNHCR 2013). The 1951 Refugee 
Convention does not provide for any specific provisions dealing with evi-
dentiary assessment. Some guidance has, however, been developed in the 
field both in the form of the UNHCR Handbook (UNHCR 2011, see 
above) and in the UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee 
Claims (UNHCR 1998).
As regards the assessment of evidence, the Qualification Directive con-
stitutes the first legally binding supranational instrument of regional scope 
establishing what criteria the applicant needs to meet in order to qualify for 
international protection. The Qualification Directive relies to a large extent 
on international and European refugee and human rights instruments and 
jurisprudence.
European countries have different legal traditions and varying practices 
regarding evidentiary assessment. If Member States apply similar legal con-
cepts on eligibility for international protection, but their treatment of the 
evidence is different, they may reach different conclusions. Asylum proce-
dures are different from other legal procedures, due partly to the serious con-
sequences of the decision taken, and partly to the lack of the usual means 
of establishing objective evidence. In most cases the asylum narrative is the 
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main source of evidence, whereas in other types of case, there are likely to be 
other witnesses who can support or call into question aspects of the claim-
ant’s account. Therefore, establishing requirements for specific procedural 
norms for the assessment of evidence and the knowledge of these standards 
are essential for a fair and effective asylum decision-making process.28 As a 
result, the Qualification Directive not only defines what a refugee or person 
needing subsidiary protection is, but it also establishes procedural norms for 
the assessment of evidence in asylum claims.
Procedural Norms for the Assessment 
of Evidence (Article 4 QDI; QDII)
Article 4 QDII29 addresses the assessment of facts and circumstances with 
regard to qualification for both refugee and subsidiary protection status. 
Article 4(1) QDII, together with Article 4(2) QDII, stipulates that it is the 
duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application 
in cooperation with the applicant. Article 4(2) QDII lists the relevant ele-
ments required for the substantiation of an application for international 
protection. These consist of the applicant’s statements and all the docu-
mentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding his age, background (includ-
ing that of relevant relatives), identity, nationality (ies), country (ies) and 
place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, 
travel documents, and the reasons for applying for international protection. 
Article 4(3) QDII states that the assessment of an application should be car-
ried out on an individual basis and lists non-exhaustively some of the factors 
that should be taken into account. Moreover, Article 4(5) QDII states that 
where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documen-
tary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation when five 
stipulated conditions are met.30 These conditions are:
28See also EASO (2015).
29The text of Article 4 is the same for QD1 and QDII, but here we refer to QDII.
30The terms of Article 4 QDI are the same as Article 4 QDII, and therefore, the same measures 
apply in the UK. UK Immigration Rules say that confirmation of the person’s statements will not 
be needed (when the five conditions in Article 4(5) QDI noted above) are met: Immigration Rules 
Part 11 Asylum: Rule 339L. (339 N ‘In determining whether the general credibility of the person has 
been established the Secretary of State will apply the provisions in s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.’).
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a. the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application;
b. all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, and 
a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other rele-
vant elements;
c. the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do 
not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to 
the applicant’s case;
d. the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possi-
ble time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having 
done so; and
e. the general credibility of the applicant has been established.
This provision is intended as a ‘translation’ of the ‘benefit of the doubt’ idea. 
The principle of the benefit of the doubt recognises the considerable difficul-
ties that applicants and decision-makers face gathering evidence to support 
the claim, and that there may still be some doubt regarding the facts.31 As 
the UNHCR Handbook puts it:
After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there 
may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. […] It is hardly 
possible for a refugee to ‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were 
a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognised. It is therefore 
frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. (Para. 203)
To sum up, the principle means that, when the conditions in QD Article 
4(5) are met, corroboration (confirmation) of the applicant’s own statements 
are not required in order to ‘substantiate’ (prove) their claim for interna-
tional protection.
Credibility Assessment
The consequence of recognising that the applicant’s statements can be suf-
ficient to establish an asylum claim is that the outcome of the claim fre-
quently turns on the credibility of those statements. UNHCR, in the 
exercise of its supervisory responsibility in relation to refugee protection, 
31UNHCR Handbook para. 203.
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has produced guidance relevant to the assessment of credibility (UNHCR 
2013), but neither the APD nor the QD explicitly or comprehensively pre-
scribes how credibility assessment should be carried out.
So, although the international and European legal framework  establishes 
principles and standards, it provides no predetermined structured approach 
for the assessment of credibility. A national approach therefore will and may 
be based on free evaluation of the evidence. As the substantive chapters 
show, the experience of asylum seekers is often that reliance on credibility 
does not work to their benefit, in the positive way that the benefit of the 
doubt principle, as discussed by Zahle (2005), suggested that it could. 
Instead, it works against them, and they meet a ‘culture of disbelief ’ 
(see Kobelinsky, Hambly, Affolter et al, Schneider this volume).
Article 4(2) the Duty to Co-operate
The CJEU has—in a preliminary ruling—clarified the scope of application 
of the duty to cooperate in Article 4(2) QD. First, the court states that the 
assessment of facts and circumstances takes place in two separate stages. 
The first stage concerns the establishment of factual circumstances which 
may constitute evidence that supports the application, and the second stage 
relates to the legal appraisal of that evidence, which entails deciding whether 
there is a need for international protection.32 The Member State’s duty to 
cooperate with the applicant, according to the CJEU, is only applicable to 
the first stage, when the facts and circumstances are being established, and 
can therefore be understood as the duty to cooperate to assemble all relevant 
evidence that supports the application, or to cooperate with the applicant 
as he takes on the burden of proving the case. Cooperation does not extend 
to the task of assessing whether the applicant has shown that a real risk of 
persecution or serious harm on return exists, or that s/he has discharged that 
burden to the required standard of proof.33 According to the CJEU the duty 
to cooperate means, in practical terms, that if, for any reason  whatsoever, 
32CJEU 22 November 2012, C-277/11, M.M. para. 64.
33‘Not needing confirmation’ suggests a relaxed burden of proof and ‘cooperation’ suggests a relaxed 
standard of proof for asylum processes compared with civil and criminal processes. ‘Substantiation’ 
therefore incorporates both the burden and the standard of proof since a claim will be substantiated if 
the applicant discharges the burden of proof by providing evidence to the standard required.
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the elements provided by an applicant for international protection are 
not complete, up to date or relevant, it is necessary for the Member State 
concerned to cooperate actively with the applicant, at that stage of the 
procedure, so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application 
may be assembled.
The CJEU judgment is a reminder that according to the case law of the 
ECtHR and in international refugee law the burden of assembling all rel-
evant information for an application does not fall exclusively upon the 
applicant, but is shared with the government.34 The bureaucratic setting 
of asylum decision-making does not encourage cooperation, and it is unu-
sual to expect decision makers to cooperate with evidence-gathering, as asy-
lum decision makers are expected to do, in case such cooperation interferes 
with the decision maker’s adjudicative role. That is why the duty to cooper-
ate does not extend to the legal appraisal of the evidence, and the decision 
maker’s consideration of whether, according to the standard of proof, the 
claim has been substantiated. There are indications in some of the chapters 
below of the struggles that decision-makers face as they attempt to reach a 
balance between cooperating with the applicant and practising the ‘organ-
ised detachment’ that their bureaucratic setting demands (see for example 
Schneider, this volume), and even national courts have placed limits on the 
scope of duty to cooperate.35
Judicial Remedies
Judicial protection is a crucial safeguard for asylum seekers. At the European 
level, judicial remedies are provided by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and the ECtHR. In the absence of an international judicial 
remedy that States are prepared to use, and bearing in mind that the provi-
sion of the Refugee Convention permitting States to refer disputes to the 
International Court of Justice has never been invoked,36 the CJEU plays 
a crucial role in interpreting EU asylum law. This interpreting role may 
34See also UNHCR Handbook, para. 196.
35TN(Afghanistan)[2015]UKSC 40, [73]; MJ(Afghanistan)[2013] UKUT 253(IAC).
36Refugee Convention Article 38.
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directly or indirectly define the standards for EU Member States (Garlick 
2015: 108). But while European-level remedies contribute to the develop-
ment of refugee law, they remain remote from the experience of most asy-
lum seekers, since they usually come into play only where a case raises an 
aspect of EU refugee law that requires clarification, or after national reme-
dies have been exhausted. Unsurprisingly, then, these ‘high level’ remedies 
are not addressed by any of the authors here, whose research focusses on 
the national level, where the roles of the state representative (Campbell, this 
volume), of the asylum advocate (Hambly, this volume) and of the judge 
(Sorgoni, this volume) are examined.
The EU system of judicial protection is based on the principle that all 
individuals are entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they 
derive from the EU legal order. Judicial remedies in asylum cases are there-
fore a matter for the national courts of the Member States (Boeles et al. 
2014: 411). At the national level, access to an effective remedy to chal-
lenge a negative decision must be available (Article 46 APDII; Article 39 
APDI). The ECtHR has held that, in order to be effective, the appeal must 
be ‘suspensive’, meaning that appellants must be permitted to remain on 
the territory pending the outcome of their appeal.37 The scope of an appeal 
should permit a full review (APDII Article 46), allowing not only conclu-
sions on the law but also factual conclusions, including about credibility, 
to be reviewed. Further evidence can also be submitted, such as independ-
ent expert reports about the appellant’s linguistic background, where the 
state authorities have used in-house linguistic analysis to cast doubt on this 
(Zwaan 2010). Information on how to appeal, details of time limits, etc., 
should accompany a negative decision (APDI Article 9), and appellants 
should also receive legal advice and interpretation services (Article 39 APDI: 
Article 46 APDII). As the chapters below illustrate, however, the above 
safeguards do not of themselves ensure effective access to the appeal right 
in practice, and inadequate legal representation (or none at all), poor inter-
pretation, battle-weary judges, aggressive State representatives and the for-
mality and technicality of the procedures can present asylum appellants with 
insurmountable barriers rather than access to justice. Despite these obstacles, 
success rates at appeal frequently run at between 20 and 30% (see Gill and 
Good, Kobelinsky, Campbell, Hambly, Sorgoni, all this volume; Liodden, 
this volume, reports a lower proportion in Norway), indicating how 
37Gebremedhin v France 25389/05, ECtHR, 26 April 2007; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey 
30471/08, ECtHR, 22 September 2009.
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 important the right to appeal safeguard is for refugee protection, as well as 
its potential.
Final Remarks
European Union Law has many parents and foster parents (Koopmans 
1991: 506), and these parents and foster parents are firmly rooted in the 
legal traditions of the Member States. Almost all European asylum deci-
sions stay within national legal systems, never reaching the lofty heights 
of the CJEU or the ECtHR. This means that, although we now have the 
European Union’s CEAS, national legal traditions retain considerable influ-
ence over asylum processes. We do not have space here to explore the impact 
which the different European legal traditions have on asylum processes, or 
their relationship with legal integration (Bobek 2013), but we have taken 
as a point of departure the legal origins approach, because we see it as an 
approach which looks for the correlations between legal traditions (Nicola 
2016: 869). There are many correlations between the asylum systems dis-
cussed in this volume, but three deserve emphasis. First, of course, there 
is the correlation between the human rights standards which bind all the 
states studied here, and their translation into CEAS measures, as seen in the 
Qualification Directive Article 4 on the burden of proof to be applied in 
national asylum processes. Secondly, correlations of concern about national 
security and sovereignty are also present in asylum systems. Mechanisms to 
address security issues can be found in refugee law itself, and the fingerprint 
and other personal data collected under the EURODAC Regulation also 
address Member States’ security concerns, as does the CEAS’ home within 
the EU’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice. This can lead to a situation 
where judges, rather than presenting a challenge to State authorities, might 
be just as likely to be discussing the merits of deferring to them, particularly 
where there is a climate of insecurity (Harvey 2005). At the same time, the 
realities of refugee status determination across Europe reflect a collective fail-
ure on the part of Member States to work in solidarity to protect refugees 
(Campesi 2018). This leads us to the third and final correlation. This final 
correlation is also the most hopeful, as it is the one between the “legality 
principle”—of respect for the individual and the protection of the person in 
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the determination of asylum cases (Harvey 2005), and the evidence in this 
volume’s ethnographic chapters of “legal consciousness”, in the sense of there 
being actors involved in all of the asylum processes studied here who con-
tinue to struggle with concepts of justice and fairness in their routine expe-
riences and perceptions of law in their everyday lives (Merry 1990; Cowan 
2004). Long may they continue to struggle with those concepts.
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